Lessons Learned Building Secure ASP.NET Applications

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OWASP

The OWASP Foundation
http://www.owasp.org

Provisos & Assumptions

- Presentation based on over 10 years' experience building web applications on the Microsoft stack for several clients in the Twin Cities
- Suspect some lessons learned will apply to any web project; not just those built with .NET
- Feel free to comment, disagree, question, *etc*.
- Finally, this is not a (very) technical presentation

Lessons Learned Agenda

- The Environment
- Working with Tools
  - In-the-Box
  - Near-the-Box
- New Technologies, New Opportunities

The Environment: The Open Source Situation

- A few years ago Microsoft provided almost everything needed to build web applications
- Now a growing number of sources offer free, increasingly "mission critical" components sporting varying degrees of security, such as,
  - CodePlex
  - jQuery
  - SourceForge
  - and many blogs, personal web sites & ISVs

The Open Source Side Note: Visual Studio 2010 Extensions



The Environment: The Open Source Recommendation

- Communicate a policy, formal or informal, regarding "open source" components
- At a minimum such a policy should
  - Enforce a requirement that the component's source code should be available
  - Check source code into repository
  - Specify that deployed components are built from reviewed source code

The Environment: Development Situation

- Application Concerns
  - Business requirements and "Look and Feel" dominate
  - Development best practices neither measured nor managed
- Team Composition
  - 1 senior, highly skilled lead
  - 2 to 4 moderately skilled developers
  - Not readily available… DBAs, Network Professionals, Security Compliance, Server Administrators, *etc*.

The Environment: Development Recommendation

- Add work tasks to the project plan ASAP
  - Solution previews and reviews with all parties
  - Documented code scans and reviews
- Designate a project OWASP Specialist
  - Not the lead
  - Not necessarily the "best" developer
  - Someone with an interest in security
- Train all web developers in organization
  - Create awareness of threats & solutions
  - Many inexpensive training options exist

The Environment: Configuration Sample

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configuration>
  <configSections>
    <sectionGroup name="system.web.extensions" type="System.Web.Configuration.
      <sectionGroup name="scripting" type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingS
        <section name="scriptResourceHandler" type="System.Web.Configuration.S
        <sectionGroup name="webServices" type="System.Web.Configuration.Script
          <section name="jsonSerialization" type="System.Web.Configuration.Scr
        </sectionGroup>
      </sectionGroup>
    </sectionGroup>
  </configSections>
  <appSettings/>
  <connectionStrings/>
  <system.web>
    <compilation debug="false">
      <assemblies>
        <add assembly="System.Core, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKe
        <add assembly="System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral
        <add assembly="System.Data.DataSetExtensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture
        <add assembly="System.Xml.Linq, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, Publ
      </assemblies>
    </compilation>
    <authentication mode="Windows" />
    <identity impersonate="true" />
  </system.web>
</configuration>
```

The Environment: Configuration Situation

- Controls almost every security aspect, such as, authentication, authorization, hashing algorithms, keys, *etc*.
- Internet Information Server (IIS) allows
  - Settings at the machine, root, site and folder
  - Supports overrides via GUI or code
- Few (if any) Developers or IT Professionals understand the behavior of all settings
- Infrastructure typically operates in either a lockdown or "it's a developer thing" mode

The Environment: Configuration Recommendation

- Lock down machine level settings
  - Only allow Infrastructure to edit
  - Communicate variances from the default settings
- Treat application configuration files like code
  - Keep under source control
  - Adhere to existing deployment practices
- Learn about the *allowOverride* and family of *lockXXX* attributes
  - Available since .NET 2
  - Typically applied at the machine level

Configuration Side Note: Windows Communication Foundation (WCF)

- Situation
  - Hugely successful and productive feature; not always needed or included in a web application
  - Few developers understand the technology
  - Easy to create and overlook big security holes
- Recommendation
  - Establish early production and development settings
  - Enforce usage of the promulgated settings
  - Read Microsoft's *WCF Security Guide*

The Environment: Authentication Situation

- Most applications implicitly follow a *Trusted Subsystem* security design
  - User credentials checked "at the door"
  - Shared database and domain service accounts
- Credentials managed via one repository; typically Active Directory or SQL Server
- The above suggests one application's breach may comprise other applications hosted on the same server(s) or sharing the same credentials store

The Environment: Authentication Recommendation

- Be wary of custom, application-specific credentials management solutions
- Strive for a credentials repository that is
  - Treated as an enterprise grade resource
  - Exposed by tightly controlled components
- Create domain service accounts that
  - Do serve specific functions or applications
  - Do not serve as super accounts

Authentication Side Note: Building the Enterprise Credentials Store

- Project task lists usually include security; rarely do they incorporate an enterprise resource
- Standards have lowered the costs and risks of implementing an enterprise credentials store
- Easier to implement (hide?) a credentials store within a moderately sized project
- Consider
  - Eclipse's Higgins Open Source Identity Framework
  - Microsoft's Windows Identity Foundation

In-the-Box: *validateRequest*

- Description
  - Request's input data compared to a blacklist
- Typical Usage
  - On by default
  - Regularly turned off for various reasons, such as, broken user control or misbehaving AJAX
- Recommendation
  - Do not assume it is enabled
  - When enabled not 100% foolproof; still need to validate all input

In-the-Box: *Page.ViewStateUserKey*

- Description
  - Session unique view-state identifier checked on post backs
- Typical Usage
  - Coded on a page-by-page basis
  - Turned off for performance (via *EnableViewStateMac)*
- Recommendation
  - If used, implement in a base page
  - When used not 100% foolproof against CSRF attacks; well documented help exists

In-the-Box: *maxRequestLength*

- Description
  - Limits input stream's buffering threshold
- Typical Usage
  - Default set to 4KB
  - Set to handle any request at the application level
- Recommendation
  - Set machine level to default; allow overrides
  - Lock at the application level (no large file uploads)
  - Force developers to set it explicitly at the page level

Side Note: *HttpRuntime* Settings

- Section contains *maxRequestLength* along with many other critical properties, such as, *maxUrlLength* and *enableHeaderChecking*
- Most *HttpRuntime* default settings work well; tweak them with care and caution

Near-the-Box:
Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library (Anti-XSS)

- Description
  - Encoding functions for CSS, HTML, HTML attributes, JavaScript, XML, *etc*. based on a globalized whitelist
- Typical Usage
  - Library not extremely well-known or utilized
  - Newer versions not always applied
- Recommendation
  - Incorporate into a project from the start
  - Update to latest version when scheduling 100% integration testing run

Near-the-Box:
Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library (Anti-XSS)

- Some of what's new in 4.0
  - Adjustable safe-listing for HTML/XML encoding
  - Invalid Unicode character detection
  - *HtmlFormUrlEncode*
  - LDAP encoding changes
- Each new version reflects a solution to late breaking attacks; albeit delayed

Side Note:
Anti-XSS Updates History



Near-the-Box: FXCop ASP.NET Security Rules

- Description
  - Specialized static code analysis executable by Visual Studio or the stand alone FXCop tool
  - Checks ASP.NET and ASP.NET MVC best practices
- Typical Usage
  - Not commonly applied (like most other FXCop rules)
- Recommendation
  - Get them incorporated into the build cycle; consider applying them at all code check-ins
  - Requires selling Architect, Build Manager and Project Manager

Side Note: Why Not FXCop?

- Failed rules could prevent code repository check-ins or break the build
- Generates many messages
  - Especially if applied after code complete
  - Likely ignored or requiring unplanned repair work
- While customizable and flexible, managing FXCop consumes time and skill

Near-the-Box: CAT.NET

- Description
  - Static code analysis identifying security vulnerabilities
- Typical Usage
  - Limited due to beta status at Microsoft
  - 3rd party runs tool, interprets and presents results
- Recommendation
  - Given the price (free), it's worth exploring
  - When (if) released, evaluate it
  - Alternatives (pricey) exist of varying quality

Side Note:
CAT.NET Output from a Small Application

- Data flow graph of 231,295 nodes
- Execution time of 51.7 minutes
- 1,083 issues reported (many duplicates)
- Sample of an issue…

Summary			
Problem	A file canonicalization vulnerability was found through a user controlled variable that enters the application at GetSettings.cs:399 through the variable stack0 which eventually leads to a file canonicalization issue at IOHelper.cs:184.		
Resolution	Sanitize the file path prior to passing it to file system routines.		
Entry Variable	stack0		
Confidence	High		
Source Context	**Line**	**Input Variable**	**Statement**
GetSettings.cs	399		object settingValue = getSetting.Tables[0].Rows[0]["GlobalValue"].ToString();
Lots of other details…			
IOHelper.cs	184	Return from String.Concat	getMp3Bytes = ReadFully(File.OpenRead(workDir + "\\" + waveFileName.Replace(".wav", ".mp3")));

New Technologies, New Opportunities: Azure

- Description
  - Microsoft's cloud computing solution
  - Likely to grow with cloud-based computing movement
- Potential Risks
  - Cost-driven vulnerabilities, such as,
    - Riskier JavaScript when "doing more" on the browser
    - Accidentally comingling data between storage models
  - 24x7 high-volume traffic may mask probing
  - Unauthorized access to administrative UI
    - Unknown party
    - Previously authorized party

New Technologies, New Opportunities: Entity Framework

- Description
  - Strongly-typed LINQ-based data access
  - Well received feature, usage likely to grow
- Potential Risks
  - Buries connection in new type of configuration setting
  - Validates with database constraints and code (declarative & imperative)
  - Executes SQL without stored procedures
    - Loss of DBA oversight
    - Over granting of permissions to enable feature
  - Eases direct UI-Database communications

New Technologies, New Opportunities: MVC

- Description
  - Microsoft's implementation of a Model-View-Controller
  - Well received feature, usage likely to grow
- Potential Risks
  - Facilitates secure coding practices, does not obviate the need to do so disappear
  - Eases incorporating DOS and SQL injection vulnerabilities when improperly combined with Entity Framework
  - Enjoys a very innovative environment which may let questionable code slither in

Side Note: What about Ajax and jQuery?

- .NET enjoys the same capabilities as most applications to easily create vulnerabilities with these rich technologies
- Don't forget to watch over those uniquely .NET, well documented properties, such as,
  - *IsDebuggingEnabled*
  - *ScriptManager.ScriptMode*
- Many ASP.NET methods can help
  - *Ajax.ActionLink*
  - *ValidateAntiForgeryToken*