



build | integrate | secure

# The Self Healing Cloud

## Protecting Applications and Infrastructure with Automated Virtual Patching

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## Bio: Dan Cornell

- Founder and CTO, Denim Group
- Software developer by background (Java, .NET)
- OWASP
  - *San Antonio Chapter Leader*
  - *Open Review Project Leader*
  - *Chair of the Global Membership Committee*
- Speaking
  - *RSA, SOURCE Boston*
  - *OWASP AppSec, Portugal Summit, AppSecEU Dublin*
  - *ROOTS in Norway*

## Denim Group Background

- Secure software services and products company
  - *Builds secure software*
  - *Helps organizations assess and mitigate risk of in-house developed and third party software*
  - *Provides classroom training and e-Learning so clients can build software securely*
- Software-centric view of application security
  - *Application security experts are practicing developers*
  - *Development pedigree translates to rapport with development managers*
  - ***Business impact: shorter time-to-fix application vulnerabilities***
- Culture of application security innovation and contribution
  - *Develops open source tools to help clients mature their software security programs*
    - *Remediation Resource Center, ThreadFix, Sprajax*
  - *OWASP national leaders & regular speakers at RSA, SANS, OWASP, ISSA, CSI*
  - *World class alliance partners accelerate innovation to solve client problems*

# The Cloud!



# An Apology

- Did anyone attend this talk because it had the word “cloud” in the title?
- If so ... I’m sorry
  - *Marketing made me do it*
  - *But this really does apply to certain aspects of “the cloud”*
  - *I promise...*
- At least we didn’t mention Advanced Persistent Threats
  - *Yet...*

# Who Is Your Worst Enemy?




# The Problem

- Code with automatically-identifiable security vulnerabilities gets deployed
- Trolling attackers find vulnerabilities and exploit them
- Profit?

## A Proposed Solution

1. Identify newly-deployed code
2. Identify vulnerabilities
3. Block traffic that would exploit those vulnerabilities





## Other Potential Solutions

- Run a web application firewall (WAF)
  - *You do not have one*
  - *Code changes too frequently for WAF training*
  - *WAF blocked legitimate transactions and is back in training mode*
- Find the vulnerabilities and fix the code
  - *Prioritization of new features over security fixes*
  - *Code deployments take too long*
- Do not introduce the vulnerabilities in the first place
  - *Very funny...*

## Step 1: Identify Newly-Deployed Code



- Wait to be notified about new application deployments by the development teams
- Scan your network space for new servers and applications
- Monitor files and directories

## Step 2: Identify Vulnerabilities

- Manual testing
- Automated scanning
- Manual-assisted scanning




## Step 3: Block Traffic That Would Exploit Vulnerabilities

- Generate virtual patches to block traffic to identified vulnerabilities






# ThreadFix — Consolidating vulnerability data so managers can speak intelligently about the status and trends of security within their organization





## Virtual Patching


- Connect vulnerability scanners to IDS/IPS/WAF systems
- Map data from sensors back to data about vulnerabilities



## Solution Specifics

- Code Change Detection: Watch for filesystem changes
  - *Could wire up to diffs of nmap scans but this was easier given test environment*
- Vulnerability Detection: Automated skipfish and w3af scans
  - *Open source technologies: anyone can replicate*
  - *Ability to run unattended*
- Blocking Traffic: Rules for snort and mod\_security
  - *Open source technologies: anyone can replicate*
  - *Rule compatibility*


# Skipfish Vulnerability Data



```
Terminal — bash — 80x24
var issue_samples = [
  { 'severity': 4, 'type': 50103, 'samples': [
    { 'url': 'http://192.168.1.20/demo/EvalInjection2.php', 'extra': 'response t
o \x27\x22 different than to \x5c\x27\x5c\x22', 'dir': '_i0/0' },
    { 'url': 'http://192.168.1.20/demo/LDAPInjection2.php', 'extra': 'response t
o \x27\x22 different than to \x5c\x27\x5c\x22', 'dir': '_i0/1' },
    { 'url': 'http://192.168.1.20/demo/SQLI2.php', 'extra': 'response to \x27\x2
2 different than to \x5c\x27\x5c\x22', 'dir': '_i0/2' } ]
  },
  { 'severity': 3, 'type': 40501, 'samples': [
    { 'url': 'http://192.168.1.20/demo/PathTraversal.php?action=../PathTraversal.
php', 'extra': 'responses for ../val and ../val look different', 'dir': '_i1/0'
  },
    { 'url': 'http://192.168.1.20/demo/PathTraversal.php?action=..\x5cPathTravers
al.php', 'extra': 'responses for ..\x5cval and ..\x5cval look different', 'dir':
'_i1/1' } ]
  },
  { 'severity': 3, 'type': 40402, 'samples': [
    { 'url': 'http://192.168.1.20/demo/SQLI2.php', 'extra': 'SQL server error',
'dir': '_i2/0' } ]
  },
  { 'severity': 3, 'type': 40401, 'samples': [
    @
```




## w3af Vulnerability Data



```
Terminal — vim — 80x24
<vulnerability id="[4268]" method="POST" name="OS commanding vulnerability"
plugin="osCommanding" severity="High" url="http://192.168.1.20/demo/OSCommandInje
ction2.php" var="fileName">
  OS Commanding was found at: &quot;http://192.168.1.20/demo/OSCommandInje
ction2.php&quot;;, using HTTP method POST. The sent post-data was: &quot;fileName
=%7Cping+-n+3+localhost&quot;;. This vulnerability was found in the request with
id 4268.
</vulnerability>
<vulnerability id="[4518, 4519]" method="POST" name="Blind SQL injection vul
nerability" plugin="" severity="High" url="http://192.168.1.20/demo/SQLI2.php" v
ar="username">
  Blind SQL injection was found at: &quot;http://192.168.1.20/demo/SQLI2.p
hp&quot;;, using HTTP method POST. The injectable parameter is: &quot;username&qu
ot;;. This vulnerability was found in the requests with ids 4518 to 4519.
</vulnerability>
<vulnerability id="[4803]" method="POST" name="SQL injection vulnerability"
plugin="sqli" severity="High" url="http://192.168.1.20/demo/SQLI2.php" var="user
name">
  SQL injection in a MySQL database was found at: &quot;http://192.168.1.2
0/demo/SQLI2.php&quot;;, using HTTP method POST. The sent post-data was: &quot;us
ername=d'z&quot;;0&quot;;. This vulnerability was found in the request with id 480
3.
</vulnerability>
```

# IBM Rational AppScan Vulnerability Data



```
Terminal — vim — 80x24
<IssueTypes>^M
  <Total>18</Total>^M
  <IssueType ID="attBlindSqlInjectionStrings" Count="2">^M
    <RemediationID>fix_52000</RemediationID>^M
    <advisory>^M
      <name>Blind SQL Injection</name>^M
      <testDescription>Application-level test</testDescription>^M
      <threatClassification>^M
        <name>Command Execution: SQL Injection</name>^M
        <reference>http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/sql_injection.shtml</reference>^M
      </threatClassification>^M
      <testTechnicalDescription>^M
        <text>Web applications often use databases at the backend to interact with the enterprise data warehouse. The de-facto standard language for querying databases is SQL (each major database vendor has its own dialect). Web applications often take user input (taken out of the HTTP request) and incorporate it in an SQL query, which is then sent to the backend database. The query results are then processed by the application and sometimes displayed to the user.</text>^M
        <br />^M
        <br />^M
      @
```


## Vulnerability Data

- Normalize what is provided by the scanners
- De-duplicate the results
  - *Allows for use of multiple scanning technologies*
- (vulnerability\_type, vulnerable\_url, injection\_point)
  - *Typically needed for injection-type vulnerabilities: SQL injection, XSS*
- (vulnerability\_type, vulnerable\_url)
  - *Sufficient for some vulnerabilities: Predictable resource location, directory listing*

## Vulnerability Data – What Else Do We Need?

- Standardized access to payload information would be nice
- Current rules have potential for false blocks
  - *SQL injection: Is the problem based on the code mis-handling ‘ or “*

# Virtual Patches - Snort



```
Terminal — vim — 80x24

drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (uricontent:"/demo/EvalI
njection2.php"; msg:"SQL Injection attempt"; flow: to_server,established; pcre:"
/(\n|^|\?|\&)(command=[^\&|\n]*('|\%27|\"|\%22|---|\%2D\%2D))/i"; classtype:Web-a
pplication-attack; sid:100000;)^M

drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (uricontent:"/demo/LDAPI
njection2.php"; msg:"SQL Injection attempt"; flow: to_server,established; pcre:"
/(\n|^|\?|\&)(username=[^\&|\n]*('|\%27|\"|\%22|---|\%2D\%2D))/i"; classtype:Web-
application-attack; sid:100001;)^M

drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (uricontent:"/demo/SQLI2
.php"; msg:"SQL Injection attempt"; flow: to_server,established; pcre:"/(\n|^|\?
|\&)(username=[^\&|\n]*('|\%27|\"|\%22|---|\%2D\%2D))/i"; classtype:Web-applicati
on-attack; sid:100002;)^M

drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (uricontent:"/demo/PathT
raversal.php"; msg:"Path Traversal attempt"; flow: to_server,established; pcre:"
/(\n|^|\?|\&)(action=[^\&|\n]*(.|\%2e))/i"; classtype:Web-application-attack; si
d:100003;)^M

@
@
@
```

## Virtual Patches – mod\_security



```
Terminal — vim — 80x24
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^\/demo\/XPathInjection2\.php""phase:2,chain,deny,msg:'Cross-site Scripting attempt: /demo/XPathInjection2.php [password]',id:'100000',severity:'2'
SecRule ARGS:password "<|\%3C|>|\%3E"
^M
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^\/demo\/EvalInjection2\.php""phase:2,chain,deny,msg:'Cross-site Scripting attempt: /demo/EvalInjection2.php [command]',id:'100001',severity:'2'
SecRule ARGS:command "<|\%3C|>|\%3E"
^M
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^\/demo\/XSS-reflected2\.php""phase:2,chain,deny,msg:'Cross-site Scripting attempt: /demo/XSS-reflected2.php [username]',id:'100002',severity:'2'
SecRule ARGS:username "<|\%3C|>|\%3E"
^M
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^\/demo\/XPathInjection2\.php""phase:2,chain,deny,msg:'Cross-site Scripting attempt: /demo/XPathInjection2.php [username]',id:'100003',severity:'2'
SecRule ARGS:username "<|\%3C|>|\%3E"
^M
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^\/demo\/XPathInjection2\.php(?:^|<|\%3C|>|\%3E)""phase:2,deny,msg:'Cross-site Scripting attempt: /demo/XPathInjection2.php',id:'100004',severity:'2'
```

## Virtual Patches - Formats

- Two approaches
  1. *(vulnerability\_type, vulnerability\_location)*
  2. *(vulnerability\_signature , vulnerability\_location)*
- (1) “There is a reflected XSS vulnerability in login.php for the username parameter”  
versus
- (2) “Watch out for HTML-ish characters in login.php for the username parameter”
- The snort and mod\_security rules follow approach (2)
- Integration with commercial solutions may use approach (1)




## Standard for Virtual Patch Success


- If the scanner shuts up the vulnerability is considered “fixed”
- Tweak the detection payloads until this is the case for all scanners
- Watch out for overly-aggressive signatures
- But that won't stop Advanced Persistent Threats!
  - *True*
  - *But that wasn't really the goal at the current time*



# Test Environment



# Demo!



# Results

- Snort
- mod\_security
  - *No rules*
  - *Compared to Core Ruleset (CRS)*
- Why compare to the Core Ruleset?


# Snort Results

Snort v. 2.9.0.5			
All Vulns			
	Skipfish	w3af	Total
Normal	20	10	30
Threadfix	10	?	10


## mod\_security Results – Raw

Raw Total			
	Skipfish	w3af	Total
Normal	32	14	46
CRS	44	10	54
Threadfix	11	2	13
CRS+Threadfix	18	6	24

# mod\_security Results – All Vulnerability Types



## mod\_security Results – Focus on Injection



## Trivia and Analysis

- IDS/IPS/WAF has an impact on the scanning process
  - *Snort breaks w3af scanning*
  - *mod\_security CRS introduces some false positives into skipfish scanning*
- mod\_security CRS is quite good
  - *And getting better all the time: SQL Injection Challenge*
  - <http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/06/announcing-the-modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge.html>
- Virtual patching appears to win for injection flaws



## Where Is This Useful?

- Environments where you have little or no control over deployed code
  - *XaaS – PaaS, IaaS*
  - *99% of all corporate data centers*
- Environments where you have a large “application security debt”
  - *Actual code fixes: take time and can be hard to get on the schedule*

## What Are The Problems?

- Current vulnerability data formats only allow for coarse-grained virtual patches
  - *Can lead to false blocks*
- Virtual patches likely will not stop well-informed, determined attackers
  - *See the results of the mod\_security SQL Injection Challenge*

## Next Steps

- MOAR DATA!!!
  - *Target applications*
  - *Live traffic*
- Develop import support for more scanner technologies
- Create virtual patch signatures for new vulnerability classes
  - *“Borrow” emerging CSRF protection from mod\_security CRS?*
  - *There are limitations on what can be done but we are not there yet*
- Create virtual patches for new IDS/IPS/WAF technologies

# Questions

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