### ONLINE TRACKING AND ZOMBIE COOKIES




## TODAY


- 1. tracking mechanisms
- 2. prevalence: web
- 3. prevalence: mobile
- 4. consumer choice
- 5. existing incentives
- 6. what to do

# BROWSERS

# PRIVACY BY DESIGN











#### http://pixel.quantserve.com/seg/p-6fTutip1SMLM2.js

GET/seg/p-6fTutip1SMLM2.js HTTP/1.1

Host: pixel.quantserve.com

<u>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13</u>

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate

Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,\*;q=0.7

Keep-Alive: 115

Connection: keep-alive

Referer: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/24/google-chrome-firefox-do-not-track\_n\_813189.html Cookie: mc=4d441f48-a100a-1f66c-277f6; d=EM0BPAGBBoHxDBi6IIgwALhQnyAAiCD8sQmnDMQLEAC\_UA



#### observer identifier activity

http://pixel.quantserve.com/seg/p-6fTutip1SMLM2.js

GET/seg/p-6fTutip1SMLM2.js HTTP/1.1

Host: pixel.quantserve.com

<u>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13</u>

Accept: \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate

Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,\*;q=0.7

Keep-Alive: 115


Connection: keep-alive

Referer: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/24/google-chrome-firefox-do-not-track\_n\_813189.html Cookie: mc=4d441f48-a100a-1f66c-277f6; d=EM0BPAGBBoHxDBi6IIgwALhQnyAAiCD8sQmnDMQLEAC\_UA

# PROFILE

observer identifier activity

+ +



### PROFILES

```
cobalt - - [ 3/Aug/2011:15:45:36 -0700] "GET http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=artisan+hotel+las+vegas HTTP/1.1" - - "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.107 Safari/535.1"

cobalt - - [ 3/Aug/2011:15:46:14 -0700] "GET http://twitter.com/ashk4n HTTP/1.1" - - "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.107 Safari/535.1"

cobalt - - [ 3/Aug/2011:15:47:28 -0700] "GET http://static.huluim.com/system/hulu_108321_0729114110_1.css HTTP/1.1" - - "http://www.hulu.com/the-big-gay-sketch-show" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.107 Safari/535.1"

cobalt - - [ 3/Aug/2011:15:48:25 -0700] "GET http://www.spearmintrhinolv.com/ HTTP/1.1" - - "http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=spearment+rhino" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.107 Safari/535.1"
```

cobalt - - [ 3/Aug/2011:15:49:22 -0700] "GET <a href="http://static.howstuffworks.com/en-us/skins/health/white-arrow.png">http://static.howstuffworks.com/en-us/skins/health/white-arrow.png</a>

HTTP/I.I" - - "http://health.howstuffworks.com/wellness/natural-medicine/home-remedies/home-remedies-for-

genital-herpes.htm" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10 6 8) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko)

Chrome/13.0.782.107 Safari/535.1"

# PROFILES


tyles	<ul> <li>Affluent Baby Boomers</li> <li>Auto Enthusiasts</li> <li>Corporate Execs</li> <li>Fashionistas</li> <li>Female Small Appliance Shoppers</li> <li>Foodies</li> <li>Frequent Travelers*</li> <li>Gadget Geeks</li> <li>Green &amp; Eco-Friendly</li> <li>Healthy &amp; Fit</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>High Spenders</li> <li>Luxury Sports New Parents</li> <li>Outdoor Enthusiasts</li> <li>Seniors</li> <li>Shopping Addicts</li> <li>Soccer Moms</li> <li>Spa Mavens</li> <li>Sportsmen</li> <li>Trendy Homemakers</li> <li>Young &amp; Hip</li> </ul>
ographics	<ul> <li>Age*</li> <li>Education*</li> <li>Estimated Credit Utilization*</li> <li>Estimated Household Income*</li> <li>Estimated Net Worth*</li> <li>Family Member Age*</li> <li>Gender*</li> <li>Home Owner or Renter*</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Length of Residence*</li> <li>Median Home Value*</li> <li>Number of Adults in Househ</li> <li>Occupation*</li> <li>Presence of Children*</li> <li>Type of Dwelling*</li> <li>User Hobbies &amp; Interests*</li> </ul>

# ECOSYSTEM




- 2009 study at Berkeley
- examined top 100 most-visited websites
- sample from ~30,000-45,000 users
- examine prevalence of <u>3rd party</u> cookies / beacons
   / etc


### MANY OBSERVERS








# MANY OBSERVATIONS





# MANY OBSERVATIONS

google 'trackers' on 88% of websites we sampled







### MANY OBSERVATIONS

"10,000 new websites integrate with Facebook every




"Users submit about 650,000 comments every minute"

Ken Deeter on Live Commenting - Jan 2011



### **ECOSYSTEM**



Please direct any inquiries or comments on the landscape to Terence Kawaja at <a href="https://www.iamego.gov/ian.com">https://www.iamego.gov/ian.com</a> or (212) 999-7082

# ECOSYSTEM




# MOBILE

# SMARTPHONES














### THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. | WHAT THEY KNOW

- 2010 study for the Wall Street Journal
- examined top 100 most popular 'apps' (50 iPhone / 50 Android)
- · looked for leakage of 'sensitive information'
- looked for transmission to 1st\* and 3rd parties
- include SSL encrypted traffic\*


### SENSITIVE DATA



# PROFILE

observer + Phone ID + activity =


persistent



### TRANSMISSION

- 47 apps sent location to 1 or more parties
- 56 transmit unique device id's
- phone numbers, (entire) address books, sms messages sometimes sent to 1st/3rd parties

## LOCATION ECOSYSTEM





# SURPRISING?

iPho	ne	Android		Transmits	transmit data data to app ow data to third pa	
App name	Username, Password	Contacts	Age, Gender	Location	Phone ID	Phone number
0.03 Seconds Pro						
Age My Face						
Angry Birds						
Angry Birds Lite						
Aurora Feint II: Lite						
Barcode Scanner (BahnTech)						
Bejeweled 2						
Best Alarm Clock Free						

# SURPRISE ?!


#### Opt-Out Status AI OPT-OUT INTERFACE

Select all

Clear

Submit

Member Company	Status	Opt-Out
aCerno More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
AdBrite More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
AdChemy More Information	No Cookie You have not opted out and you have no cookie from this network.	Opt-Out 🗌
Adconion More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
Adara Media More Information	No Cookie You have not opted out and you have no cookie from this network.	Opt-Out 🗌
Adify Media More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
AdMeId More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
Advertising.com More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
Aggregate Knowledge More Information		Opt-Out 🗌
Akamai More Information	No Cookie You have not opted out and you have no cookie from this network.	Opt-Out





Choose whether to be notified if there are updates to apps or games that you have downloaded



#### Google AdMob Ads Preferences

Choose whether to receive interest-based ads from Google and AdMob in mobile apps on this device. Learn more

Receive interest-based ads



- consumers need to know about tracking
- opt-outs are brittle
- there's no mechanism to opt out of tracking

# NO CHOICE?

OPT-OUT of COPT-OUT of TRACKING



Third-party Cookies



## NO CHOICE?

- •2009 study at Berkeley on "Flash Cookies"
- identified 54 of the top 100 websites uses 'flash cookies'
- tracking mechanism outside the control of most consumers
- 3 I sites had matching cookies to enable respawning' (circumvention)

# ZOMBIES STRIKE

## You Deleted Your Cookies? Think Again

By Ryan Singel 

August 10, 2009 | 7:39 pm | Categories: Advertising

Follow 

Grsingel ⋅ 2,331 followers


More than half of the internet's top websites use a little known capability of Adobe's Flash plug-in to track users and store information about them, but only four of them mention the so-called Flash cookies in their privacy policies, UC Berkeley researchers reported Monday.

Unlike traditional browser cookies, Flash cookies are relatively unknown to web users, and they are not controlled through the cookie privacy controls in a browser. That means even if a user thinks they have cleared their computer of tracking objects, they most likely have not.



Flash Cookies

# NO CHOICE?



# NO CHOICE? (V2)

- •2011 followup Berkeley Study
- 37 of the top 100 websites uses 'flash cookies'
- 15 of the top 100 uses HTML5 storage (alaringleader)
- ~5000 third party cookies set from just using top I 00 websites


## ZOMBIES STRIKE AGAIN



PREVIOUS POST NEXT POST

#### Researchers Expose Cunning Online Tracking Service That Can't Be Dodged

By Ryan Singel ☑ □ July 29, 2011 | 6:24 pm | Categories: Privacy ✓ Follow @rsingel · 2,971 followers



# TECH

## HULU RESPAWN

## Initially using 3rd party Flash code from Quantcast



It's your audience. We just find it.™

but...


#### Lawsuit Hits Companies Using 'Zombie' Flash Cookies

Posted by **kdawson** on Tuesday July 27 2010, @09:43PM from the brains-for-a-filling dept.




A privacy activist has filed a lawsuit targeting eight corporate users of Quantcast's "zombie" Flash cookies, in addition to Quantcast itself. The suit alleges that MTV, ESPN, MySpace, Hulu, ABC, Scribd, and others used Quancast's Flash-based cookies to recreate browser tracking cookies that users had taken the trouble to delete.

# HULU DIY



# HULU RESPAWN V2



## Via Flash in <a href="http://www.hulu.com/guid.swf?v2">http://www.hulu.com/guid.swf?v2</a>

```
function setComputerguidInFSO(value) {
    com.ns.utils.ConsoleLogger.getInstance().debug("setComputerguidInFSO: Start");
    __globalFSO = SharedObject.getLocal("BeaconService", "/");
    __globalFSO.data.computerguid = value;
    __globalFSO.flush();
    com.ns.utils.ConsoleLogger.getInstance().debug("setComputerguidInFSO: Done");
```

## HULU RESPAWN V2+

## Via HTML5 / IE LocalStorage in

http://static.huluim.com/system/hulu\_107336\_0728135042\_1.js

## Safari/Mozilla/Chrome

```
params = Object.extend(params, {
        user_id: Behaviors.getUserId(),
        history: UserHistory.get_history(),
        watched_history: UserHistory.get_watched_history(),
        guid: Beacon.computerGUID()
     });

var store = window.localStorage;

this.set = function(k, v) {
   if (store)
        store.setItem(k, v);
}
```

## Internet Explorer

```
var userData = backend.create(function()
    return !! window.ActiveXObject &&
}, function() {

var store = appendDiv(function(div) {
        div.id = '_cram_userData';
        div.style.display = 'none';
        div.addBehavior('#default#userDa
     });
    store.load("_cram");
```

## KISSMETRICS RESPAWN

## Via Flash, HTML5, AND Cache ETag in

http://douglizaerwt3.cloudfront.net/5a68d120b211c810289fc36493663648821d58aa.1.js

#### FLASH:

ifc = initializeFlashCookie

fsc = flashSaveCookie

fgc = flashGetCookie

#### HTML5 LocalStorage:

ils = initializeLocalStorage

lss = localStorageSave

lsg = localStorageGet

#### IE UserData:

iud = initializeUserData

uds = userDataSave

udg = userDataGet

Cache ETags: KM\_CID

## ETAGS

## via http://i.kissmetrics.com/i.js

#### **INITIAL REQUEST:**

GET /i.js HTTP/I.I

Host: i.kissmetrics.com

#### **RESPONSE:**

Etag: "Z9iGGNInI-zeVqbgzrlKkl39hiY"

Expires: Sun, 12 Dec 2038 01:19:31 GMT

Last-Modified: Wed, 27 Jul 2011 00:19:31 GMT

Set-Cookie: \_km\_cid=Z9iGGNInI-zeVqbgzrlKkl39hiY;expires=Sun, I2 Dec 2038 01:19:31

GMT;path=/;

#### SUBSEQUENT REQUEST:

GET /i.js HTTP/I.I

Host: i.kissmetrics.com

If-None-Match: "Z9iGGNInI-zeVqbgzrlKkl39hiY"

#### **CONTENTS:**

VAR KMCID='Z9iGGNInI-zeVqbgzrlKkl39hiY'; if(typeof(\_kmil) == 'function')\_kmil();


## CACHED ETAG

```
Cache entry information
                kev: http://i.kissmetrics.com/i.js
          fetch count: 8
          last fetched: 2011-07-26 22:03:36
         last modified: 2011-07-26 21:59:12
             expires: 2038-12-11 20:19:31
            Data size: 79
          file on disk: none
             Security: This document does not have any security info associated with it.
               Client: HTTP
       necko:classified: 1
      request-method: GET
       response-head: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
                     Cache-Control: max-age=864000000, public
                     Content-Type: application/x-javascript
                     Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2011 01:19:31 GMT
                     Etag: "Z9iGGN1n1-zeVqbgzrlKk139hiY"
                     Expires: Sun, 12 Dec 2038 01:19:31 GMT
                     Last-Modified: Wed, 27 Jul 2011 00:19:31 GMT
                     P3P: CP="NOI CURa ADMa DEVa TAIa OUR IND UNI INT"
                     Server: nginx
                     Content-Length: 79
             charset: ISO-8859-1
                                                                      var KMCID='Z9iGG
000000000: 76 61 72 20 4b
                             4d 43 49 44 3d 27 5a 39 69 47 47
                                                                      N1n1-zeVgbgzrlKk
00000010: 4e 31 6e 31 2d 7a 65 56 71 62 67 7a 72 6c 4b 6b
00000020: 6c 33 39 68 69 59 27 3b 69 66 28 74 79 70
                                                              65 6f
                                                                      139hiY';if(typeo
00000030: 66 28 5f 6b 6d 69 6c 29 20 3d 3d 20 27 66 75 6e
                                                                      f( kmil) == 'fun
```


ction') kmil();

00000040: 63 74 69 6f 6e 27 29 5f 6b 6d 69 6c 28 29 3b

## MATCHING IST PARTY COOKIES



## PRIVATE



## KISSMETRICS API

## Multiple People/Same Computer (Advanced)

What happens if someone in the same household uses the same computer and you call identify again? KISSmetrics will automatically detect this and will not alias the two named identities together (it will recognize them as separate people). However, it should be noted that any activity before you call identify for the second user will be attributed to the first user. Let's see how this works:

- 1. Bob comes to your site and is assigned the anonymous identity qFq2LweZugFNE4049hLhmRPBW34
- Bob then logs in and you call identify telling us that the identity is now bob@site.com. The
  activity from before Bob logs in (when we knew him as qFq2LweZugFNE4o49hLhmRPBW34) is
  automatically tied to bob@site.com.
- 3. All activity continues to be attributed to bob@site.com, even after Bob logs out.
- 4. Now Bob's brother Bill comes in to use the computer and visits your site. All activity will continue to be attributed to bob@site.com. KISSmetrics has no way to know that it is a different person sitting at the keyboard automatically.
- 5. Bill logs in and you call identify telling us that the identity is now bill@site.com. KISSmetrics does not alias bill@site.com and bob@site.com it treats these as two separate people.
- 6. All activity from this point on is attributed to bill@site.com (until you call identify again)

# MANY TECHNIQUES

## Lawsuit Targets Mobile Advertiser Over Sneaky HTML5 Pseudo-Cookies

#### Facebook Like button tracks you, even if you don't click

May. 19, 2011 (10:14 am) By: Lee Mathews



### Race Is On to 'Fingerprint' Phones, PCs



#### By JULIA ANGWIN And JENNIFER VALENTINO-DEVRIES

IRVINE, Calif.—David Norris wants to collect the digital equivalent of fingerprints from every computer, cellphone and TV set-top box in the world.



He's off to a good start. So far, Mr. Norris's start-up company, BlueCava Inc., has identified 200 million devices. By the end of next year, BlueCava says it expects to have cataloged one billion of the world's estimated 10 billion devices.


TECH

History Sniffing: How YouPorn Checks What Other Porn Sites You've Visited and Ad Networks Test The Quality of Their Data

## MANY ACTORS




Solution: The Convertro Visitor Tracking Code completely eliminates the issues of cookie dependency. This means that a visitor can clear his/her browser cookies and cache or toggle between browsers and still appear as a unique visitor. We also have at least a 50% success rate tracking the same visitor across machines if they do end up converting. The result is a very rich set of conversion data that most accurately represents the true sources that drove any particular conversion.



2. On average, visitors use 1.5 browsers to surf the internet. Since cookies are browser specific, when the customer switches between browsers, conventional methods duplicate these visitors.

3. Increasingly strict browser default privacy and security settings can result in the blocking of third party cookies and, in some cases, first party cookies. Cookiedependent methods would be ineffective under these scenarios.





4. If a customer visits a site via two different machines prior to a conversion event, the visitor sessions will not be linked, causing traditional analytics software to report two different visitors – one that purchased and one that didn't.

## MANY LAWSUITS


## ONLINE

Home > Online Media Daily > Tuesday, Aug 2, 2011

#### KISSmetrics, Hulu Sued Over New Tracking Technology

by Wendy Davis, Yesterday, 5:19 PM

Article ▼ Comments (2) ▼



Two major Web companies, Hulu and Spotify KISSmetrics' analytics service after it emerge the company was using "ETag" technology to they delete their cookies.

#### **MediaPostNEWS**

## ONLINE

Home > Online Media Daily > Thursday, Aug 4, 2011

#### Dozens Of Web Companies Sued For 'ETag' Tracking

by Wendy Davis, 16 minutes ago

Article ▼ Comments ▼



Two California residents have brought a privacy lawsuit against KISSmetrics and 25 separate Web companies, including iVillage, Spotify and GigaOm, for allegedly using KISSmetrics' analytics to track visitors.

The case, filed by John Kim and Dan Schutzman, is the second major lawsuit stemming from KISSmetrics' technology, which relies on ETags for tracking. Last week, two different Web users <u>sued</u> KISSmetrics and Hulu for allegedly violating federal and state laws with ETags. The technology is controversial because ETags can be used to track consumers even when they delete their cookies.

Be the first to recommend this article.




Be the first of your friends to like this.











# CHOICE?





# SURPRISE ?!

# THE LOVESTORY

## DEFAULTS



only browser that blocks 3rd party cookies by default

# INCENTIVE\$ (PLATFORMS < 3 ADS)



doesn't have web


advertising business

# INCENTIVE\$



initial revenue from sale of phone (licensing/etc)





## developers

ongoing revenue from app sales



## smartphone platforms = advertisers





ongoing revenue from advertising

## FACEBOOK: APPS



# FACEBOOK: INCENTIVES

#### **Fields**

The User object has the following fields:

Name	Description	Permissions	Returns
id	The user's Facebook	No access_token required	string
name	The user's full name	No access_token required	string
first_name	The user's first name	No access_token required	string
middle_name	The user's middle name	No access_token required	string
last_name	The user's last name	No access_token required	string
gender	The user's gender	No access_token required	string
locale	The user's locale	No access_token required	the ISO Language Code and ISO

## PERCEPTIONS


our browsers are our 'user agent'

we 'buy' our mobile devices

facebook is for us to connect to 'our friends'

# "if you're not paying for it, you're the product being sold"

# WHAT TO DO?



WHAT THEY KNOW

DECEMBER 18, 2010

### What Can You Do? Not Much



#### By JENNIFER VALENTINO-DEVRIES

It's nearly impossible to prevent cellphone "apps"—games and other software—from transmitting information about a phone and its owner.

Turning off the phone's location services can restrict tracking by location. But it can limit some phone features like maps.








Add-ons for Firefox > Extensions > Targeted Advertising Cookie Opt-Out (TAC...





## **Use Google location**

Google's location service provides applications with your approximate location without using GPS.

You can disable these features in Settings, under Location & Security and under Privacy.




Allow Google's location service to collect anonymous location data. Collection will occur even when no applications are running.




Use My Location for Google search results and other Google services.





OK

Cancel



## WHISPERSYSTEMS

PRODUCTS UPDATES FAQ JOBS EGYPT


#### Network security for Android.

WhisperMonitor provides a software firewall capable of dynamic egress filtering and real-time connection monitoring, giving you control over where your data is going and what your apps are doing.




#### Dynamic egress filtering.

When enabled, WhisperMonitor will monitor all outbound network traffic and issue dynamic prompts in order to determine egress filter rules.





#### http://mobilescope.net



# MobileScope: demo



#### MobileScope: primary concepts

use handset agnostic network inspection to detect patterns

applications for both security & privacy

 toggle on/off as needed to analyze new or suspect applications



#### mobilescope: current capability

 traffic inspection for any handset capable of PPTP VPN

SSL inspection for iOS devices

rudimentary self-service enrollment

basic signatures for mobile malware and PII leaks



### mobilescope: next steps

- bulletproof / easy self-enrollment
- optional auto-detection of unique identifiers
- SSL VPN: better NAT traversal
- SSL inspection for Android devices?
- autoconfiguration for Android?
- enhanced signatures for mobile malware and PII leaks
- better visualization / communication of results



### mobilescope: technical concerns


VPN API's are private and/or immature


proxy architecture creates latency

storing "dossiers" on end users makes us a target

egress filtering/fraud detection on our network














#### Install Profile



#### MobileScope

dev.mobilescope.net



Install

Description This profile configures a VPN connection to the MobileScope cloud and also installs a private trusted root certificate that allows MobileScope to inspect SSL traffic sent to or from your device.

Signed dev.mobilescope.net (466870-

Q7lWcHYC1368cFaK)

Received Jul 21, 2011

Contains Certificate

VPN Settings

#### More Details




#### MobileScope Collusion

Each dot represents an app or a website which has received a canary hit

#### data.flurry.com

The host <u>data.flurry.com</u> tracks your behavior across the following apps.



```
# This Ruleset is EmergingThreats Open optimized for snort-2.8.4.
# alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 8080 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan Command and Control Communication"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST "; nocase falert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET SHTTP_FORTS (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Google Android Device HTTP Request"; flow:established,to_server; content:"|Od Oa|User-Agent|3|
# alert top SHOME_NET any -> 184.105.245.17 8080 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE DroidDream Android Trojan info upload"; flow:to_server,established; uricontent:"/GMServer/GMServelet
# alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET SHTTP_PORTS (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan HongTouTou Command and Control Communication"; flow:established,to_server; content:
# alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 8118 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan MSO.PUApps checkin 1"; flow:established,to_server; content:"/push/androidxml/"; depth::
# alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 8080 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan MSO.PUApps checkin 2"; flow:established,to_server; content:"log"; depth:200; nocase; of the server top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 8080 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan DroidDream Command and Control Communication"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST "; nocase; depth:200 alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 81 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan Fakel0086 checkin 1"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST "; nocase; depth:5; control alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 81 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan Fakel0086 checkin 1"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST "; nocase; depth:5; control top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 81 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan Fakel0086 checkin 2"; flow:established,to_server; content:"req.php"; nocase; depth:5; control alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTERNAL_NET 81 (msg:"ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android Trojan Fakel0086 checkin 2"; flow:established,to_server; content:"req.php"; nocase; depth:5; control alert top SHOME_NET any -> SEXTE
```



Search Threatpost

(Q

Tuesday, July 26th, 2011

The Kaspersky Lab Security News Service

Home Topics Blogs Multimedia Res

Home > Business Security >


July 12, 2011, 12:29PM

#### Zeus Banking Trojan Comes to Android Phones

by Paul Roberts

Share






Researchers say they have obtained a Zeus variant, dubbed "Zitmo," that can run on Android phones and that has the ability to intercept one time pass codes sent to mobile phones as an added, "two factor" security measure.

BUT

# WHACK-A-MOLE?






### DO NOT TRACK

IDEA: create a reliable signal to companies that a given user does not wish to be tracked

# DEFINITION


absterater



essent


### IMPLEMENTATIONS





header based signal





blocking collection

# OPEN QUESTIONS

# OPEN QUESTIONS

- what should the default be? (what's the right balance?)
- can consumers reasonably judge risk?
- will control mechanism enable even more invasive collection? (affirmative consent = worse practices)
- does this paradigm favor certain players? (i.e those with 1st party relationships)
- how will international compliance be enforced?

### OVERLOAD



### OPT-IN?




# REASONABLE RISK?



**BACKUPS?** 

# BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS



hyperbolic discounting / availability heuristic

- what should the default be? (what's the right balance?)
- can consumers reasonably judge risk?
- will control mechanism enable even more invasive collection? (affirmative consent = worse practices)
- does this paradigm favor certain players? (i.e those with 1st party relationships)
- how will international compliance be enforced?

# QUESTIONS?

#### ashkan.soltani@gmail.com twitter: ashk4n

http://knowprivacy.org

http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk-mobile/

http://ashkansoltani.org/img/location\_ecosystem.jpg

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1446862